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I.S.B. #6555
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
EDWARD NICHOLAS BURSIEL, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NO. 42576
BONNER COUNTY NO. CR 2014-2620
REVISED APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Edward Bursiel timely appealed from his judgment of conviction, and he now
asserts that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. Mr. Bursiel
further asserts that the district court erred by denying, in part, his motion for credit for
time served.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In 2014, over the course of three days, Edward Bursiel chatted online with a
detective posing as a 14-year-old girl. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter,
PSI), p.3.) The detective responded to a post in the “Personal and Casual Encounters”
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section of Craigslist – a section requiring participants to affirm they are at least 18 years
old – in which Mr. Bursiel indicated he was seeking sexual encounters with, “Any race,
size, or age. I don’t care.” (PSI, p.3; R, p.100.)1 Mr. Bursiel and the detective engaged
in sexually explicit conversations and arranged to meet. (PSI, p.3.) During one of the
conversations, Mr. Bursiel sent an explicit picture of male genitalia. (PSI, p.3.) Based
on these facts, Mr. Bursiel was arrested and charged by information with one count of
internet enticement and one count of misdemeanor disseminating material harmful to
minors. (R., pp.65-67.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Bursiel pled guilty to enticement, and the
State dismissed the misdemeanor charge. (Tr. 7/14/14, p.7, Ls.11-18, p.8, Ls.17-21;
R., pp.139-148.) The State also agreed to recommend a unified sentence of no more
than 13 years, with three years fixed, and to recommend that the sentence be
suspended. (Tr. 7/14/14, p.6, Ls.8-11; R., pp.139-148.) The defense was free to argue
for less. (Tr. 7/14/14, p.6, Ls.13-14; R., pp.139-148.)
During the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor indicated the terms of the plea
agreement were “five years fixed, five years indeterminate, for a total unified sentence
of ten years.

That that be suspended.”

(Tr. 9/5/14, p.17, L.25 – p.18, L.2.)

Mr. Bursiel’s counsel asked for a three-year term of probation. (Tr. 9/5/14, p.20, Ls.9910.)

The district court sentenced Mr. Bursiel consistent with the State’s

This Court ordered the district court to prepare a Limited Clerk’s Record. (See Order
Granting Motion to Augment, entered April 5, 2016.) The Limited Clerk’s Record
contains documents that were filed in the district court after the original Clerk’s Record
was created; however, the page numbers do not continue from that point but rather start
over. Therefore, citations to the original Clerk’s Record will include the designation
“R.”, while citations to the Limited Clerk’s Record will include the designation “Lim. R.”
1
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recommendation, but retained jurisdiction. (Tr. 9/5/14, p.23, Ls.7-22; R., pp.159-163.)
Mr. Bursiel filed a timely Notice of Appeal.

(R., pp.167-170, 175-179.)

After a

successful rider, the district court suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Bursiel on
probation for three years. (Lim. R., pp.37-56.)
In his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Bursiel argued the State breached the plea
agreement by arguing for a unified term of 10 years, with five years fixed, rather than
the agreed upon 13 years, with three years fixed.

(Appellant’s Brief, pp.4-10.)

Mr. Bursiel also argued that the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-13.)
This Court granted the State’s motion to remand Mr. Bursiel’s case to the district
court in order to determine the precise terms of the plea agreement – a motion that
Mr. Bursiel did not oppose. (See Order to Remand, entered January 14, 2016.) On
remand, the district court determined that the appropriate remedy under the
circumstances would be to enter an amended judgment, nunc pro tunc, imposing a
unified sentence of 13 years, with three years fixed, but also recognizing that Mr. Bursiel
had already successfully completed his rider and had been placed on probation. (Lim.
R., pp.310-323; Tr. 2/25/16.)2
While Mr. Bursiel’s initial appeal was on-going, allegations that he violated the
terms of his probation were being litigated in the district court. Mr. Bursiel’s probation
was initially transferred to the State of Washington and, on May 1, 2015, he was taken
into custody by his Washington probation officer after failing a polygraph.

(Lim.

In light of the district court’s decision on remand, Mr. Bursiel withdraws his claim that
the prosecutor breached the terms of the plea agreement.
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R., pp.60, 88-89.) On June 26, 2015, the State filed a report alleging that Mr. Bursiel
had violated the terms of his probation in multiple ways while he was in the State of
Washington. (Lim. R., pp.58-89.) The district court entered an order to show cause and
issued a bench warrant, and Mr. Bursiel’s custody was transferred from Washington
officials to Idaho officials. (Lim. R., pp.90-107.)
While his initial probation violation allegations were pending, Mr. Bursiel posted
bond and he was released from custody.

(Lim. R., pp.118-126.)

Two-and-a-half

months later, the State filed a new report of probation violation alleging Mr. Bursiel
absconded and, a month after that, the State filed an additional probation violation
allegation related to Mr. Bursiel being charged with a new crime in Washington State.
(Lim. R., pp.151-207.) After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court found
that Mr. Bursiel violated the terms of his probation by committing a new crime in
Washington State; by possessing password-protected electronic files; by engaging in
sexual activity without the approval of his probation officer; by using a computer without
the approval of his probation officer; and, by consuming alcohol; but found insufficient
evidence to prove either that his son was a minor when he had contact with him or that
he had absconded on the date alleged, and found another allegation to be too vague to
provided adequate notice. (Lim. R., pp.292-305; Tr. 2/2/16; Tr. 2/3/16.)
During the disposition hearing, the State requested that the court revoke
probation, while counsel for Mr. Bursiel asked the court to continue him on probation
and requested he be given 465 days of credit for time served. (Tr. 3/11/16, p.6, Ls.911; p.9, L.23 – p.10, L.1.) The district court followed the recommendation of the State
and revoked Mr. Bursiel’s probation, executing the previously imposed unified term of
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13 years, with three years fixed. (Lim. R., pp.361-362; Tr. 3/11/16, p.13, Ls.17-24.) As
to the question of the proper amount of credit for time served, the district court held off
on making a ruling, giving the parties an opportunity to determine if they could come to
an agreement on the proper amount of time. (Tr. 3/11/16, p.14, L.22 – p.15, L.17.)
Mr. Bursiel also filed a timely Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. 3 (Lim.
R., pp.364-365, 374-386.)
The prosecutor entered a written motion arguing that Mr. Bursiel was entitled to
353 days of credit for time served as of the date the district court orally pronounced it
was revoking probation. (Lim. R., pp.331-332.) The prosecutor included the 30 days
from July 8, 2015, when the prosecutor claimed Mr. Bursiel was served the bench
warrant for the original probation violation allegations,4 to August 7, 2015, when he
bonded out of jail. (Lim. R., p.331.) During a hearing (in which Mr. Bursiel was not
present), counsel for Mr. Bursiel argued that Mr. Bursiel “was arrested for something on
April 29, 201[5], and remained in custody until he bonded out on August 7,” and should
get an additional 71 days of credit not calculated by the prosecutor for that time,
although “a warrant wasn’t even issued on this case until that June 26 date.”
(Tr. 3/31/16, p.22, L.23 – p.23, L.16.) Counsel for Mr. Bursiel also argued that he
should receive credit for 42 days he served between October 8, 2015, when he was
arrested in Washington for the second time, until November 19, 2015, when he

In light of the standards of review articulated in State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201
(2007), Mr. Bursiel does not raise the denial of his Rule 35 motion as an issue in this
appeal.
4 The warrant return of service shows the warrant was actually served on Mr. Bursiel on
July 2, 2015. (Lim. R., pp.97-99.) It appears the prosecutor was relying upon an
erroneous entry in the Register of Actions. (Lim. R., p.331.)
3
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transported back to Idaho, even though he was facing new charges in Washington at
that time. (Tr. 3/31/16, p.23, L.21 – p.25, L.12.)
The district court ruled from the bench that Mr. Bursiel was not entitled to the 71
days prior to being arrested on the first bench warrant, but took the other issue under
advisement. (Tr. 3/31/16, p.25, L.13 – p.26, L.4.) The district court entered a written
order the following week denying Mr. Bursiel credit for the time he served in custody in
Washington State from October 8, 2015, to November 19, 2015, wherein he was being
held for his new criminal activity in Washington.5 (Lim. R., pp.393-395.)
Two and-a-half months later, Mr. Bursiel filed a pro se motion for credit for time
served along with an affidavit which included a Jail Time Certification from the Benton
County Washington Sheriff’s Office, demonstrating that he was incarcerated in the
Benton County jail between May 1, 2015 and July 16, 2015. (Augmentation, pp.1-6.)6
Mr. Bursiel stated that he was being held solely on probation violations during that time
period and he requested 77 days of credit for time served that the court had not
previously granted. (Augmentation, pp.3-6.) Without making any factual findings or
considering the merits of Mr. Bursiel’s claim, the district court denied the motion finding
“the issue of credit for time served has already been decided.” (Augmentation, pp.7-8.)

Because the record in this case indicates that the second bench warrant was not
served upon Mr. Bursiel until November 20, 2015, he does not challenge the district
court court’s denial of these 42 days of credit for time served. (See R., pp.244-245.)
6 Simultaneously with this brief, Mr. Bursiel filed a motion to augment the record with the
documents related to his pro se motion for credit for time served. That motion is
currently pending.
5
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked probation and executed
Mr. Bursiel’s sentence?

2.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Bursiel 68 days of credit for time served?
ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Probation And Executed
Mr. Bursiel’s Sentence
Mr. Bursiel asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its

discretion by revoking his probation and executing his unified 13-year sentence, with
three years fixed. When a probationer has admitted to violating the terms of probation,
the decision on the proper disposition is left to the sound discretion of the district court.
The governing objectives in determining the appropriate punishment for criminal
behavior are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public
generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.
Edward Bursiel is a Marine Corps veteran, who served from 1986 to 1994 when
he was honorably discharged. (PSI, p.9.) He also has a strong work history and has
been self-employed since 1998 performing landscaping and sprinkler maintenance in
the summer, and doing dry walling and odd jobs in the winter months. (PSI, p.10.)
Mr. Bursiel was remorseful, and expressed his regret regarding his conduct.
(See, e.g., PSI, pp.3-4, 12-13.) During his original sentencing hearing, Mr. Bursiel told
the district court:
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Your Honor, I’m sorry for my behavior and I’m here to accept responsibility
for my actions. I’m just kind of nervous now – and what I did was
inappropriate and wrong and I’m ashamed of myself.
...
And like I said, I’m really truly sorry and this -- this is a one time thing and I
wasn’t thinkin’ in my right mind when I did it and I assure you nothing like
this is gonna happen -- happen in the future. And I just want to thank you
for your consideration and that’s basically all I have to say.
(Tr. 9/5/14, p.20, L.21 – p.22, L.3.) Mr. Bursiel knew he had done something wrong and
wanted to take responsibility for his wrongful conduct by pleading guilty to the offense.
(Tr. 11/8/13, p.7, Ls.8-18; PSI, pp.12-13.) Additionally, Mr. Bursiel apologized for his
actions during the disposition hearing, stating that he had a lot of time to reflect on his
actions while he was in jail, and noting that, if the court were to place him back on
probation, he would be able to stay at the State Motel, which is Department of
Correction approved housing with a 6 p.m. work week curfew, and is locked down on
weekends. (Tr. 3/11/16, p.10, L.4 – p.11, L.12.)
Idaho Courts recognize that military service, a strong work history, and remorse
for one’s conduct, are all mitigating factors that should be considered by the district
court when that court determines the appropriate punishment. See State v. Nice, 103
Idaho 89 (1982); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593 (1982); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho
204 (Ct. App. 1991). Mr. Bursiel asserts that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking his probation and executing his sentence, in light of the mitigating factors that
exist in his case.
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II.
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Bursiel 68 Days Of Credit For Time Served7
“A motion to correct a court's computation of credit for time served, granted
pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 18-309 or 19-2603, may be made at any time.” I.C.R.
35(c). Idaho Code § 19-2603 states that a defendant is entitled to any credit for time
served in custody following an arrest made pursuant to Idaho Code § 20-227. I.C. § 192603.

Idaho Code § 20-227 authorizes a probation officer to arrest a probationer

believed to have violated the terms of probation, without the need to first obtain a bench
warrant. I.C. § 20-227.
Along with his pro se motion for credit for time served, Mr. Bursiel provided his
own affidavit and a Jail Time Certification from the Benton County Washington Sheriff’s
Office, demonstrating that he was incarcerated in the Benton County jail between
May 1, 2015 and July 16, 2015. (Augmentation, pp.3-6.) Mr. Bursiel swore that he was
being held solely on probation violations during that time period and he requested credit
for time served accordingly. (Augmentation, pp.3-6.) Mr. Bursiel’s factual assertions
are supported by the record in this case.
The prosecutor filed the initial probation violation allegation based upon reports
generated by Mr. Bursiel’s Washington State probation officer who stated that

Although Mr. Bursiel’s trial counsel asked for 71 days of credit for time served during
the post-disposition hearing, and Mr. Bursiel asked for 77 days of credit for the time
period between May 1, 2015, and July 16, 2015, in his pro se motion, the record reflects
the district court granted Mr. Bursiel’s credit from the time the prosecutor mistakenly
claimed the bench warrant was served on July 8, 2015. Therefore, at issue in this
appeal is whether Mr. Bursiel should be granted credit for the 68 days he spent in
custody in Washington from the time he was arrested on May 1, 2015, through July 7,
2015.

7
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Mr. Bursiel was taken into custody on May 1, 2015, and he remained in the Benton
County Washington jail until he was transferred to Bonner County Idaho jail on July 16,
2015. (Lim. R., pp.58-104.) While a bench warrant was not served upon Mr. Bursiel
until July 2, 2015 (see Lim. R., pp.97-99), the record demonstrates unequivocally that
he was being held under a written statement made by his Washington State probation
officer, which served as the functional equivalent of an agent’s warrant, solely on the
basis of his probation violations from May 1, 2015, until July 16, 2015 (Lim. R., pp.58107). See I.C. § 20-227. Mr. Bursiel’s Washington State probation officer filed three
separate reports, each of which indicate that he was “in custody” at the time the reports
were generated. (Lim. R., pp.65-89 (see specifically pp.66, 82, 89 (box in upper left
corner checked “in custody.”)))
The district court initially denied Mr. Bursiel credit for the time he served in
Washington State between May 1, 2015 and July 7, 2015, based upon the erroneous
belief that he was not entitled to credit for time served until the bench warrant was
served upon him which the court apparently believed was on July 8, 2015. (See Lim.
R., pp.331-332 (prosecutor’s calculation of credit for time served); see also Tr. 3/31/16,
p.26, Ls.13-19 (“[H]e will not get those 71 days. He – there’s no bench warrant; there
was no probation violation filed.

So the fact that he got arrested on something in

Spokane and was in custody, he is not entitled to credit for time served until this Court
issued a warrant and we served him with it.”)) In denying Mr. Bursiel’s pro se motion for
credit for time served, the district court merely stated “the issue of credit for time served
has already been decided,” and the court apparently did not consider either the
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evidence Mr. Bursiel provided or the evidence already available in the court’s file, and
the court did not apply the relevant law. (Augmentation, pp.7-8.)
The credit for time served that Mr. Bursiel requested is mandatory (see
I.C. §§ 19-2603; 20-227), and the district court erred in denying Mr. Bursiel credit for the
68 days he served in jail between May 1, 2015, and July 7, 2015.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Bursiel respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district
court with instructions to place him back on probation or to otherwise reduce his
sentence as it deems appropriate. Additionally, Mr. Bursiel respectfully requests that
this Court remand his case to the district court with instructions that Mr. Bursiel be
granted an additional 68 days of credit for time served.
DATED this 18th day of August, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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